Ukraine became independent in 1991 and formally abandoned central planning. But the development of market methods of input supply and product distribution was impeded by continuing price distortions and the survival of various methods of administrative commodity allocation from the central planning period. This paper outlines the background environment of central planning in Ukraine, reviews the extent to which central planning practices have continued, and illustrates this through two sectoral examples: coal mining and agriculture. It is found that significant elements of non-market allocation of goods and services remain in Ukraine, and proposals are made for further reforms.
Introduction
Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, there are indications that Ukraine has held on to significant elements of its old supply and distribution system, and has retained some of the Soviet-type agencies and institutions which were responsible for administering the economy. If this were so, it would be quite a serious discovery since it would impede moves towards the establishment of a well functioning market economy. When ex-president Kravchuk 1 was asked about the situation regarding supply ministries he gave a contradictory answer, neither confirming nor denying their continued presence. It appeared that he was unaware what the real situation was. Government officials and economic agents questioned 2 in Kiev also gave contradictory answers. Some said the old supply ministries were still present. Others said 'no' they had been disbanded. According to the Director of the Centre for Research into Communist Economies, Ljubo Sirc, 3 the old supply and distribution network had collapsed well before reforms were embarked upon, and there was the realisation that something new and more effective had to be put into place. The mystery remains that after the disintegration of the Soviet Union we do not really know what has happened to individual republics such as Ukraine.
It is this intriguing uncertainty that this paper will attempt to investigate. Among other things, the paper will seek to establish answers to the following questions: How far, if at all, has the central planning system encompassing the supply and distribution network survived from the days of the Soviet Union? What impact have economic reforms and the introduction of the market had on the institutional structures of the economy, and the behaviour of economic agents like enterprises? Have economic reforms had a uniform effect on all sectors of the economy, or has their impact varied from sector to sector?
Having now established the key theme, the paper will be divided into a number of sections.
Following on from this introductory section, the second section will review the command economy system, and the politics behind it. Section three will investigate the extent to which the movement towards an economy based on market principles has resulted in a dismantling of the institutions, agencies, and practices of the central planning system which administered the allocation of resources. Section four will examine the extent to which the practices of central planning are still in operation using a sectoral approach. A final section will offer some concluding remarks in the light of the information presented.
The politics of the planned economy
The distinction between politics and economics is not easy to draw in any country given that economic policy is formulated through the decisions of politicians. In the case of the former Soviet Union the distinction becomes even more difficult given the degree of control exercised by state actors over every aspect of the economy. This is why the phrase 'politics of the planned economy' is so appropriate here. This section will now proceed to outline the institutions, characteristics and problems associated with the planned economy relevant to the paper's main theme.
The institutional structure of central planning
Due to the extreme level of centralisation of the Soviet economy, and the degree of control exercised by the state, a study of the institutional structure of the Soviet economic system cannot be divorced from a study of the political institutions, since all actors involved in the economy were ultimately accountable to a state organ. Figure 1 below illustrates a simplified version of the command economy structure and the planning process as applied to the former Soviet Union. The diagram is constructed in a manner which takes account of the need to distinguish between the party and government as far as their role was concerned.
The key institution within the Council of Ministers as far as the economy was concerned was Gosplan (the State Planning Committee). Gosplan was responsible for preparing proposals for the five year plans, and annual plans based on feedback it received from the ministries and enterprises. The most important was the five year plan that set the planned, medium-term increases in output for each sector of the economy, and indicated the major capital investments for the next five years. The annual plans were more operational, providing the basis for the detailed plan targets distributed to all enterprises as the main tool of plan implementation. Committee of the CPSU, and gained their approval, they were then submitted to the Supreme Soviet (the legislative body). Any minor changes were incorporated in a final draft which was adopted as a formal law, and was therefore obligatory upon all ministries and enterprises. In other words management was responsible to the government rather than shareholders or private owners, and capital and other inputs were allocated by the planners rather than obtained on the market. The command administrative system placed a lot of pressure on enterprises. The final plan was passed on to ministries for implementation, the ministries having the task of ensuring that the targets in the plan were met by the factories and farms under their control.
As mentioned before the chief executive and administrative body of the Soviet Union was the at the lower end of the institutional structure were under the authority of the ministries. The ministries and departments had their own vested interests to protect. As White et al. put it 'ministries … seek to build empires responding to the needs of the enterprises for which they are themselves responsible but neglecting the needs of other sectors of the economy'. 4 This then was the overall Soviet picture. But where did the individual republics fit in? Figure   2 shows that the institutional structure and the planning process illustrated in Figure1 was repeated throughout all the republics.
If we take Ukraine as an example 5 we will see that it had a parallel structure to that of the 
Characteristics and problems of central planning
In the absence of a free market the state had to bring together the suppliers of the means of production, and the users of these goods. In the USSR this was done by Gossnab (the state supply system administration) which employed some one million workers by the end of the regime in 1991. Its collapse generated severe disruption by severing links between enterprises.
The planned distribution system was organised in such a way that specialisation, which would have encouraged economic efficiency through economic rationality was neglected. This The economy was organised along sectoral or branch lines typically with an administrative ministry or department in charge of a specific branch. Competition was restricted, and there was no free market for either commodities (products) or labour. The command economy was essentially a supply-dominated system rather than a demand system. It rested on a centrally operated and state-owned economy that functioned as a single state monopoly. Having now sketched the nature of the command economy, some of its shortcomings can be highlighted.
The first of these problems was related to the overall notion of planning which is involved in such a system. The command economy system suffered from inflexibility. Planning in such a system tended to involve a very long period of gestation and discussions about the plan before it was implemented. Once it was decided to implement a plan there was limited scope for altering it. This led to problems because plans were prepared in advance, and by the time it came for the plan to be implemented tastes had changed, techniques had changed and product components may have altered. Ironically, planning systems appeared most effective when the economy was only changing slowly, if at all, and central planning proved unable to cope with the increasing diversity and rapid change of a modern economy.
The second major problem faced by the command economy was the lack of incentives for innovation, due to the lack of an effective profit motive. Because production was geared towards meeting targets, and existing output could always be sold, there was no incentive for research and development. This is in line with Kornai's 7 argument that in a supply constrained economy no one has any incentive to innovate.
Thirdly the system suffered from surprisingly poor coordination of supply and demand. The inability to equate supply and demand resulted quite often in over production of some goods (surpluses) and under production of others (shortages). As a result, in some cases demand was more often unfulfilled (especially in the case of consumer goods), and in the case of other goods there was overproduction. One reason for this situation was that planners were poorly informed about the preferences of individuals, which were at best imperfectly revealed in Soviet consumer markets. Moreover, even when the planners sought to observe outcomes to learn about preferences, the subsequent adjustment of plans inevitably gave rise to an extremely prolonged adjustment process.
Part of the difficulty was an unavoidable problem of aggregation of plan information. For instance, the main tool for constructing the annual plans was the method of material balances, sometimes running to several hundred or, occasionaly, even several thousand balances (this sounds a lot, but is is actually pitifully few in relation to the number of products in any real economy). For each major item, the available sources of supply were estimated (domestic production, imports) and set against the requirements (inputs used for production, investments, consumer demand, exports, and possible changes in stocks). Balance was achieved through internal iterative adjustments: e.g. there might be a decision to produce more, or cuts in intermediate or final uses, and as a last resort foreign trade would come to the rescue to provide the missing quantity or dispose of the expected surplus. In reality the process was never convergent because of data bias, computational problems, and lack of motivation, and time to refine calculations.
Other shortcomings of the planned economies included: the lack of specialisation of their industrial structure. Owing to their import substitution bias, none of the East European economies fully realised the potential advantages of the international division of labour;
Central planning tended to overestimate the advantages of large scale enterprises. Enterprises consequently tended to be beyond optimum size; the system lacked any interconnected economy-wide network of prices covering goods and services. Actual prices in command economies were not very rational at the outset, and were frozen at a specific past year with subsequent erratic and unpredictable corrections. As a result prices tended to diverge from the costs of production, and more importantly took no account of the market mechanism to equate supply and demand, and hence clear markets.
Overall the economy was detached from the consumer and the producer, and non-economic criteria were frequently used, departing from economic rationality. It has to be stressed that the problems with planning were mostly to do with goods. Services were not planned in such a centralised way, though they did suffer from the persistent under-allocation of resources to that sector..
Impact of reforms and the market on the institutions, agencies and practices of central planning
This section will investigate the impact that reforms and the introduction of the market have had on the institutions which made up the central planning system. It also discusses how market reforms have affected the situation and behaviour of enterprises which were at the bottom of the command economy hierarchy, and which are likely to face new challenges under market transition. This will allow us to determine how much of the old Soviet administrative system has survived and in what form, and further, to assess how much market behaviour has replaced central planning practices.
Institutional changes
Since independence there has been some institutional restructuring of Ukraine's economic bureaucracy which has seen the disappearance of some old structures, and the emergence of some new ones. The most obvious change in terms of institutional relationships has seen the elimination of the dual subordination system whereby republican ministries were accountable to both the republic's government and the counterpart ministry in central government (i.e.
Moscow). Today Ukraine has its own political and administrative system though this is based heavily on the old one. The overhaul of the administrative system has seen the Ukrainian 
Enterprises, economic behaviour and market reforms
What about the behaviour of enterprises in relation to supply and distribution, as a result of the economic reforms implemented to date?
Since the introduction of market reforms an almost 'Darwinian' type of situation arose regarding enterprises, where the fittest were able to survive relatively easily while those in difficulties were finding it almost impossible to continue operations. However, the latter have In cases where there has been a breakdown in the old supply chain between enterprises, this has left many enterprises isolated; moreover, this situation is quite common, not least because many of the disrupted links involved other republics of the former Soviet Union.
One of most important consequences of the breakdown of the supply network has been its profound impact on output. In the case of a study carried out by Bateman 9 , covering North Western Kazakhstan and Siberia in relation to the oil and gas industry, the collapse of communism has seen the collapse of the supply chain for oil and gas equipment. This has been quite devastating because the oil and gas industry is a key sector for these regions. The collapse of the wide variety of inter-enterprise linkages, including the supply chains constructed under central planning, led to a steep fall in output. This resultant scenario can also be applied to Ukraine. The supply chains which emerged under communism were inefficient for a number of reasons: They were inflexible and slow. Also enterprises at the start of the supply chain (upstream) were often considered less important than those at the end (downstream). Despite this one cannot dismiss the fact that they worked. Table 1 below illustrates the fall, in some cases dramatic, in output (GDP) in some of the republics of the formwer Soviet Union since independence. Table 1 highlights the problem which has beset some of the former Soviet republics. There have been in many cases staggering falls in Gross Domestic Product in the years immediately after independence. In this respect Ukraine has not been alone in suffering falls in the level of economic activity. Clearly the collapse of the former Soviet Union hit the newly independent states very badly. Although in fairness, the collapse of the supply and distribution system has not been the only factor which has caused falls in output. Among the other factors which have contributed to this include: no outlet for selling production; loss of former markets has forced producers to produce less (cannot sell it). In contrast while there have been output falls in the rest of Eastern Europe, it is noticeable that the countries which were not part of the Soviet Union, e.g. Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, and Romania, suffered much less dramatic falls, and in most cases have actually now started to experience increases in GDP. This could be partly because they did not experience sudden and wholesale break-ups of their supply and distribution networks. Also, in countries like Hungary and Poland market reforms were in place well before the collapse of communism so they were prepared for what would be required to meet the challenges of transition.
After initial negative attitudes to privatisation, most remaining state enterprises in Ukraine now accept it as a necessary step to take, and the process has been advancing much faster recently, with over 400 thousand firms reported privatised at the end of 1996, representing an increase of 70 per cent over from the previous year. 10 However a largely unstable macroeconomic environment, and a weak commitment and hesitancy about reforms by the Parliament has meant that enterprises supporting privatisation have not yet benefited greatly.
There is also a great deal of economic behaviour which threatens or at least interferes with the introduction of market practices in the Ukrainian economy, and which consequently has implications for enterprises. This type of behaviour resembles some aspects of central planning behaviour. One aspect of the problem arises at the local level where there are some internal barriers to trade exercised by local authorities. For example there have been a number of reported instances whereby local administrators have placed partial or total quantitative restrictions om inter-regional trade. These quantitative restrictions do not usually involve finished products but resources or other inputs used at earlier stages of the production process. In one such case producers from the Eastern regions were prevented from selling their grain to Western regions because local administrators were concerned about shortages of grain. An analogy can be drawn here with the Bulgarian case when the sale of grain abroad resulted in shortages at home. In other instances in Ukraine local authorities have tried to ban transfers of energy supplies on the grounds that these resources were needed by enterprises needing to use them for barter exchange. However, an official from the Ministry of Economy 11 insisted that such practices by the local authorities were not widespread, and that there were no internal impediments to trade. It is difficult to establish the extent to which such practices are being employed, but the balance of evidence is that they are quite widespread.
Corruption and the shadow economy in the context of Ukrainian economic reforms
Here we consider the roles of corruption and the emergence of a shadow economy in impeding Ukraine's transition to the market. The emergence of a shadow or unofficial economy, estimated to account for about 50 per cent of GDP, has had serious negative consequences for Ukraine. There has been the loss of considerable revenue from taxation.
According to one Ukrainian official 12 high taxes and deregulation are the main causes of the growth of the unofficial economy. When asked why officials did not intervene to end unofficial economic activities he replied: 'Because they are themselves corrupt, and receive payments from individuals to turn a blind eye'. 13 Another reason is simply because of the poor economic situation, in which the state acknowledges that some people must engage in such activities merely to survive. About 40 per cent of the labour force is said to have income from the shadow economy. The visible poverty suggests that reforms have so far produced more losers than gainers; though the blossoming of informal activity suggests, more positively, that many people can find ways of earning an income, and demonstrates that in some respects the market system is indded functioning ni Ukraine.
According to one official 14 property. There is also organised bureaucratic crime which refers to the ability of strategically placed individuals in government or state enterprise positions to claim, transfer, and otherwise appropriate state assets for private gain, a process sometimes called nomenklatura privatisation. It is well generally accepted in Ukraine today that if you have money you can get deals done. 15 For example,an enterprise can obtain various inputs by making a substantial payment to unofficial sources, and in some cases even to official contacts who are involved in corrupt practices.
The need to deal with corruption and the realisation that measures have to be taken is indicated by recent events. On April10 th 1997 President Kuchma launched a drive against corruption 16 called the 'National Programme of the Struggle against Corruption'. Ukraine initially had a law on the struggle against corruption but in practice it had fallen into disuse.
According to the new programme, up to the 1 st of October1997, all state officials will have to come through a process of vetting to check on their reliability, and those officials who are violating laws will be removed. This is definitely a bold move, and it will be interesting to see how committed Kuchma's government will be in enforcing it. In relation to one industry, the coal industry, where supply and distribution are still heavily based on central planning, the issue of corruption has cropped up in regard to the allocation of government credits for coal industry restructuring, prompting Kuchma to call on the National Security Council to investigate the problems.
Survival of the practices of central planning: a sectoral approach
While the command economy system has been formally disbanded, current practices in some sectors of the economy still resemble those seen under central planning, 17 hardly conducive to the development of a market economy. Even in sectors where there has been a breakdown in the former, centralised supply system, this does not mean that its replacement yet involves normally functioning markets.
This section will investigate the extent to which the old system of state planning and the central allocation of resources are still in operation by analysing the situation in two sectors of the economy, namely the coal industry and the agricultural industry.
Coal industry
According to a recent World Bank report 18 the Ukrainian coal industry is in deep crisis:
Between 1990 and 1995 coal output decreased by 50 per cent; the productivity of coal miners is extremely low; from being one of Ukraine's major exports coal exports have virtually disappeared, and much coal is now imported along with other fuels. Reasons for this include:
artificially maintained high domestic coal prices, poor coal quality, and untimely delivery.
The coal industry in Ukraine provides a good example of the persistence of central planning practices in certain areas of the economy. In 1995 much of the coal was still being distributed under a centralised system by Ugelesbyt (a state controlled body which behaves like a monopoly, and through which most of the coal is distributed) rather than marketed under contracts which would bring together suppliers and consumers. There is still a special state order for coal. More than 90 per cent of domestic coal production was distributed through
Uglesbyt in a very similar way to the previous central allocation and distribution system, and with the same distorting results on the development of a market. A number of factors reduced the willingness of the mines to pursue direct contacts:
• There was a perception of state guarantees behind the payments for the fulfilment of sector plans;
• High cost mines received the cross-subsidised accounting price if they sold through Uglesbyt;
• Low cost mines had difficulties finding promptly paying customers since they lacked marketing skills;
The consequences of maintaining this system are negative for consumers, the coal industry, and the state budget. Under cash shortages, Uglesbyt distributes the available coal among consumers regardless of the payment capabilities of the clients and with little regard to coal quality. Consumers as well as producers have little influence on the distribution.
In late 1994 the Ministry of Coal Industry, the key government agency for the coal sector, was established taking over the responsibilities of the former State Coal Committee. In practice it still acts like its predecessor, being responsible for approval of coal production, and marketing plans, establishment of coal prices, decisions regarding the closure and development of mines. Uglesbyt has a monopoly to market most of the coal produced in Ukraine. It allocates coal according to a sector plan that maintains the perception of state guaranteed payments.
Why then do central planning practices exist to such an extent in the coal industry? It is argued that the coal industry retains established central planning practices because of some social problems which demand state intervention but that this is not the case in most other sectors. The coal industry has many deep rooted problems which have delayed restructuring.
First, the industry is very inefficient with many mines producing very little coal at high prices. This is seen in the fact that in 1996 (Jan-Oct) 58.4m tons of coal was produced representing a reduction of 17.5 per cent from the previous year, with around 100 mines producing coal at a cost of $200 per ton in comparison to Poland where production costs were $34 per ton. 19 The Ukrainian government initiated action on this problem recently by formulating a restructuring programme with World Bank advice, which would result in the closure of many mines, with foreign credits being used to ease the ensuing adjustment process. Because of the legacy and long history of central planning in Ukraine the implementation of the restructuring of the coal industry is one of the most challenging tasks that the Ukrainian government is faced with. What is likely to further hamper the introduction of free market principles is the same issue that transition economies like Ukraine have been so keen to avoid, namely the potential negative social consequences. Dispensing with non-market allocation methods in the coal industry in the course of restructuring is likely to increase pressure to shed jobs. This will happen as a result of the closure of uneconomic mines, and pressure and incentives to reduce costs in all mines as the industry starts to operate competitively.
The retention of non-market methods of allocation, while clearly inefficient from an economic viewpoint, would of course mean that workers made redundant could be retained in jobs or be supported in some other way. To lessen the social impact of restructuring will require considerable budgetary resources. Already problems have appeared on the horizon in the government's attempts to begin implementation of the restructuring programme. There have been complaints from the head of the company charged with restructuring that in 1996 only 69m hryvnias had been allocated from the state budget instead of the pledged 130m hryvnias.
The situation for the coal industry has been very bleak for a long time and it will take monumental improvements to reverse this situation. Already imported coals have captured a significant share of the Ukrainian market, and they are likely to hold on to this unless Ukrainian mines can reduce production costs, and dramatically improve the reliability, quality and quantity of coal deliveries. In 1995 about 16m tons of coal was imported, representing an increase of more than 200 per cent over the previous year.
In view of the problems faced by the coal industry, largely due to the industry's unwillingness to divorce itself from central planning, what policy prescriptions can be offered to revitalise the industry? As noted, the World Bank has been instrumental in helping to restructure the coal industry. Recently it gave a loan of $300m to be repayable over 17 years for this purpose. The World Bank has gone to great lengths to prepare a comprehensive and detailed plan 20 for restructuring of the coal industry, indicating issues which would have to be tackled, and actions which would have to be taken. If this plan were to be successfully implemented it would instil much needed market principles into the industry. The World Bank plan can be summarised briefly in the following terms:
• Market liberalisation -The need to abolish the system of coal distribution by the state.
Currently a state body, Uglesbyt allocates coal according to a sector plan that maintains the perception of state guaranteed payments. Also there is a need to liberalise coal prices, and gradually decrease and eliminate subsidies for household coal consumption.
• Closure of uneconomic mines -The need to execute closure plans aimed at minimising the cost and time needed for closure. Currently the Ministry of Coal Industry has recommended extended closure procedures in order to reduce unemployment. These longer closure processes make the mine closures very costly.
• Corporatisation -The need to establish joint-stock companies, and then to develop a privatisation programme for those joint-stock companies that demonstrate profitable operation in the completely liberalised coal market.
• Mitigation of social costs -This has been a key issue so far, and the World Bank suggests various actions such as : strengthen institutions that will implement retraining and job creation programmes; set up public employment schemes to help the long term unemployed in distressed regions; and offer employment to workers of closing mines at remaining mines if possible.
• Sources of financial support -There is no doubt that coal mines are unable to cover the cost of restructuring. Support from the budget should be provided in a way that does not distort decisions about production and investments. Funds allocated should cover lump sum payments related to the cost of transferring employees and work places, and severance payments, and re-employment support to employees.
Agricultural sector
Agriculture has long been an important branch of the Ukrainian economy. Its fertile black soil generated more than one-fourth of Soviet agricultural output, and its farms provided In the sphere of supply and distribution, under the old system this was monopolistic in nature, and operated through relatively few of the larger state and collective farms which dominated in the sphere of production. However, this system did not pay attention to the most appropriate supplies or to regulating aspects of quality concerns to do with agricultural materials (i.e. inputs like fertilisers, pesticides; equipment like tractors and combines) and finished products. The overall system of supplies of technical and material resources and finished goods functioned with great difficulties and almost collapsed.
Today there is still considerable involvement of the old state supply system in the distribution of agricultural material and technical resources, although this is done now in conjunction with private means. State organisations supply primarily materials and technologies that are produced in Ukraine including grain, cooking oils and agricultural technology. Private companies primarily provide supplies of imported oils, grain and agro-chemicals. Today the productivity of agriculture suffers great damage because of insufficient supplies of imported agricultural materials many of which Ukraine did not produce itself in necessary quantities.
The state's preservation of a significant level of central planning behaviour, including unjustified state intervention, has not helped matters. Specific reasons why supplies of imported materials has not been arriving in sufficient quantity include:
• A lack of necessary support for the development of private supplies or outlets for the supply of material and technical resources;
• Many foreign producers of agricultural materials do not want to supply them to state enterprises in credit because of delays of payments as well as indebtedness of the government to them
• Enterprises do not have money to pay for these materials.
What is required in the agricultural sector is a combination of organisational., institutional, and legislative changes which would help to eradicate the remnants of central planning and replace them with market-like institutions and methods. This would involve demonopolisation and commercialisation; de-monopolisation of state processing and trading organisations is one of the principal steps towards the competitive market and privatisation.
This demands an immediate increase in the autonomy of state enterprises through the separation of economic regulation from the state.
Ukraine has adopted moderately liberal legislation on FDI and joint ventures, including some provision for tax privileges. However, the country has not yet established suitable preconditions for FDI in agriculture and the food industry, in terms of the necessary commercial environment. This is because:
• The grain and meat branches are still under direct/indirect state control;
• Procedures for foreign participation in processing and distributive branches are not properly regulated;
• Internal markets are not yet very attractive;
If we look at the trading network which consists of around 52000 individual trading institutions (businesses and firms), mostly small, we will find more evidence of central planning behaviour. Prices are being fixed by the state and directors of individual stores or business frequently have no right to ignore directives from state bodies. • To eliminate gradually all state orders including those for material and technical supplies;
• To eliminate interference with price-making policy;
• To eliminate subsidies to material and technical resources;
• To support only the development of private enterprises;
• Granting of subsidies on prices of consumer goods to be limited to the incomes of the very poor;
These measures would of course help to speed up the elimination of central planning practices in agriculture, and allow the gradual introduction of a comprehensive market system. The
World Bank recognises that such a transformation will not occur overnight and as a result proposes a three-stage approach for the introduction of the above proposals.
Conclusions
This paper has shown that relatively little remains of the institutions and agencies of central planning either by name or in terms of the role of the new bodies in the post-communist era.
Ukraine's movement towards a market economy has demanded that the roles of institutions responsible for administering the economy be changed. Enterprises which were last in the chain of command have had to face fresh challenges to cope with the introduction of market reforms and privatisation, and many have failed to adjust to these demands and some have even demonstrated an unwillingness to do so. They have faced difficulties on both sides of the production equation: in obtaining inputs and selling output.
While it might be true to say that the formal institutions of central planning have largely disappeared and that a considerable element of the market is in place, there is considerable evidence to suggest that central planning behaviour and practices have survived in some cases. In other words, the abolition of central planning practices has not been uniform, and sectors such as coal and agriculture have found it extremely difficult to make the adjustment to the market. As a result, they have managed or have been allowed to maintain a considerable degree of central planning practices. In some cases the government has been unable to relinquish everything to the market, and has treated some sectors as too important to leave to the market. Despite what is happening in these sectors a large proportion of the economy, according to
Ukrainian officials, has made substantial movement towards the market, 23 and market practices are in place. Commercial banking is widely regarded as an effective example of market transformation. 24 However, there is evidence that the relevant ministries in the coal and agricultural sector are now willing to take on board the transition to market practices even though this has been extremely slow to materialise thus far.
Therefore, in response to the question how much of the central planning system has survived.
The answer is not much, in terms of both institutions and practices. Only a few sectors are now characterised by central planning, and if planned reforms in these sectors are successfully implemented then even these sectors will have eliminated central planning behaviour in the very near future. As far as the institutions are concerned, the old ones have gone and new ones have appeared, with the exception of some ministries which have survived largely unchanged. However, even these can no longer be regarded as supply ministries of the type witnessed under communism as they have taken on new roles. The supply and distribution system is now largely in the hands of the market.
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